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A hybrid approach to estimate the asymmetric price transmission between the farm gate and the retail market is
proposed. The model is estimated for the fluid milk market of the Northeast U.S., that of the metropolitan area of New
York City as well as that of Upstate New York. Spatially disaggregated data allows the impact of regional dairy regulation
on the farm-retail price spread to be assessed, as well as the behavior of the middlemen regarding price transmission on
markets with different levels of retail concentration to be estimated. Results suggest that intermediaries transmit variations
in milk farm price in an asymmetric way in the short-run; that governmental intervention might force middlemen to act
competitively in terms of price transmission; and that a high degree of concentration at the retail level is not synonymous
with inefficient price transmission.Asymmetry in Farm-Retail Price Transmission Frigon, Doyon, Romain
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1. Introduction
Throughout the 1920’s and 1930’s, the U.S.
government passed several acts designed to counteract
the perceived market power of dairy processors, and
consequently, increase the share of economic surplus
captured by producers (Doyon and Novakovic, 1997).
The level of market power exerted by middlemen in the
U.S. dairy industry is still a subject of controversy in the
literature today. The evolution of marketing margins
raises concerns among farmers regarding the efficiency
of price transmission in the sector.
The concept of price transmission is closely related
to market efficiency (Emerick, 1994) and its analysis
aims at answering the following questions: by how much
is a change in farm price  reflected in retail price? How
much time does it take for the adjustment to take place?
Is there a difference in the way that the retail price
adjusts to an increase or a decrease in farm price? (Ibid.).
These questions are of primary importance to both
consumers and dairy farmers. In fact, if an increase in
milk farm price is more fully transmitted to consumers
than a decrease, then the competitive market regulation
mechanisms are not effective. That, in turn, may have
implications in terms of society’s welfare.
The objective of this study is to develop a marketing
margin model to investigate potential asymmetry in farm
price transmission. Spatially disaggregated data are used
in order to assess the price transmission process in
regions with different market structures. To reach this
objective, Section 1 presents a concise literature review
as well as the theoretical framework of the study.
Section 2 presents the empirical model as well as the
appropriate tests. Section 3 is a succinct description of
the data used. Finally, Section 4 describes the empirical
results.
2. Literature and Theoretical Framework
2.1 Literature review on price transmission
Numerous studies have analyzed asymmetric price
transmission because it is perceived as a symptom of
market imperfection. Asymmetry in farm-retail price
transmission may result from a high degree of
concentration beyond the farm gate (Kinnucan and
Forker, 1987), from government interventions (Ibid.) or
from imperfect information among economic agents
(Stiglitz, 1989).
The hypothesis that a high degree of concentration in
the food industry may be the cause of asymmetric price
transmission is based on the Mason-Bain paradigm
(structure-conduct-performance model). This paradigm
maintains that a positive relationship exists between
price, profit, price-cost margin and the degree of
concentration of an industry
1. On the other hand,
modern market theorists like Stiglitz (1979, 1989) have
argued that if an industry shows a low degree of
concentration, the cost of collecting and processing
information will be high for consumers. Therefore,
firms could enjoy a certain degree of market power,
which could lead to asymmetric price adjustment. The
observations of Weaver et al. (1989) for the food
industry tend to support the modern market theorist’s
view.
With respect to government intervention, Kinnucan
and Forker (1987) indicated that the price support
policy in the U.S. dairy industry might affect the
behavior of middlemen and lead to asymmetric price
transmission. Under such a regulation, intermediaries
may see a farm price decrease as being only a
temporary phenomenon, so that changing the retail
price of milk is not necessary to remain competitive.
Kinnucan and Forker (1987) combined the markup
model proposed by Heien (1980) and the approach
proposed by Houck (1977) to specify and estimate
nonreversible functions. This procedure is used to
assess the asymmetric response in the retail price to
variations in the farm price in the U.S. dairy industry.
This approach has been subsequently used in the citrus
industry (Pick et al., 1990), in the beef, lamb and pork
industry (Griffith and Pigott, 1993), in the dairy
industry (Emerick, 1994), and in the peanut industry
(Zhang et al., 1995). However, Kinnucan and Forker’s
methodology has some limitations, such as the
assumption of constant return to scale and that of a
competitive market beyond the farm gate.
The competitive market hypothesis is of particular
importance because long-run asymmetry in price
transmission may reflect the market power of the
middlemen (processor and/or retailers). In addition, the
assumption that the farm-retail price spread is
independent of the quantity of the agricultural
commodity marketed is limiting. A decrease in the
quantity marketed may not result in a corresponding
reduction in the use of marketing inputs, which could
likely have an impact on the industry’s marketing
margin.
Moreover, Kinnucan and Forker, as well as
Emerick (1994), used nationally aggregated data which
did not allow them to identify which factor is likely to
be predominant in explaining asymmetric price
response. In fact, nationally aggregated data cannot
                                                       
1 See Schmalensee et al. (1989), chap.16, for a complete
discussion and an extensive literature review of these issues.Asymmetry in Farm-Retail Price Transmission Frigon, Doyon, Romain
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reflect a region-specific feature such as the degree of
concentration of retailers.
Hansen et al. (1994) mentioned two types of
asymmetric price transmission: short-run and long-run.
Short-run asymmetry occurs when the immediate effect
on retail price is not the same whether farm price is
increasing or decreasing, but the long-run impact is
similar. Long-run or irreversible asymmetry occurs
when an increase in the farm price in the short-run has a
different impact than a decrease in the long-run, i.e. after
the full adjustment period. The major distinction
between these two types of asymmetric price
transmission relates to their respective effect on
marketing margins. Long-run price transmission
asymmetry implies that intermediaries increase their
margins in an irreversible way while short-run
asymmetry reflects a temporary effect on marketing
margins. The Kinnucan and Forker approach does not
allow the explicit evaluation of short or long-run
asymmetry on the farm-retail price spread.
The marketing cost model that was first proposed
theoretically by Tomek and Robinson (1990) offers an
interesting alternative to the markup model. Wohlgenant
and Mullen (1987) have interpreted this structural model
as a reduced empirical form. The marketing cost model
has been widely used in several industries to explain the
farm-retail price spread (Wohlgenant and Mullen, 1987
(beef); Thompson and Lyon, 1989 (orange); Farminow
and Laubsher, 1991 (corn); Lyon and Thompson, 1993
(milk)). Although the performance of this model did
vary significantly among studies, Lyon and Thompson
(1993) found it robust for the U.S. fluid milk market.
They indicate that the marketing cost model performs
especially well with monthly spatially-disaggregated
data. Furthermore, and unlike the markup model, the
marketing cost model does not assume constant return to
scale. It relies, however, on the assumption of a
competitive market. Thus, marketing firms are assumed
to purchase milk up to the point where the marginal
marketing cost is equal to the farm-retail price spread
2.
The marketing cost model, in a competitive market
situation, can be expressed as follows:
M = f (Q, MC) (1)
                                                       
2 The use of that model for the U.S. fluid milk industry is
especially relevant. The governmental regulation in that
industry makes the Class I price of milk known at least one
month before a sale is actually concluded. At that price, the
processors can buy as much milk as they wish. Thus, we can
subtract the farm price at both sides of the profit maximizing
equation in a competitive market (retail price = marginal cost)
and obtain the following identity: farm-retail price spread =
marginal marketing cost.
where M is the farm-retail price spread, Q is the
quantity of the agricultural commodity marketed and
MC is a marketing cost index.
Studies that have analyzed the asymmetric price
transmission in the U.S. dairy industry have shown that
increases in the farm price are transmitted more fully to
the retail price than are decreases (Kinnucan and
Forker, 1987; Novakovic, 1991; Emerick, 1994;
Hansen et al., 1994). Based on this result, Hansen et al.
(1994) argue that asymmetric price transmission is one
of the main factors that have driven the expansion of
the farm-retail price spread since the late eighties in the
U.S. fluid milk market. Therefore, the short-run and
long-run asymmetry concepts can be further defined as
follows:
Short-run price transmission asymmetry: situation
where middlemen take advantage of the farm price
fluctuations to generate temporary, above-normal
profit.
Long-run or irreversible price transmission asymmetry:
situation where middlemen take advantage of the farm
price fluctuations to generate permanent, above-normal
profit.
2.2.  The Theoretical Model
The concept of above-normal profit refers to the
ability of marketing firms to maintain progression in the
farm-retail price spread above that of the marginal
marketing cost. To account for these potential
deviations from the competitive market equilibrium, a
further variable is added to the marketing cost model.
This variable reflects farm price fluctuations, which
could be the source of competitive market deviations
through short- or long-run asymmetries. Therefore, the
marketing cost model in a situation of imperfect
competition becomes:
M = f (Q, MC, ¶) (2)
where ¶ accounts for competitive market deviations due
to farm price instability. The other variables were
defined previously. The economic relationship depicted
by equation (2) is the basis of this study. The next
section is devoted to the determination of the empirical
form of that relationship.
3. The Empirical Model and Appropriate Tests
3.1.  The Empirical Model
To develop an empirical form of the model
presented in the previous section, assume a competitiveAsymmetry in Farm-Retail Price Transmission Frigon, Doyon, Romain
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3.2. Testing for Asymmetric Marketing Cost
Transmission
To test for symmetric marketing cost transmission
by middlemen, the cumulative value of increases in
marketing cost should be equivalent to the cumulative
value of decreases in marketing cost. Therefore, the
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3.3.  Testing for Farm Price Transmission
Complete price transmission requires that the
cumulative values of the parameters associated with
variables INCFP and DECFP are not statistically
different from zero. Therefore, the tests are given by


















i a for farm price decrease
If hypothesis H2 is rejected, this indicates that farm
increases are not fully transmitted to the retail level.
Similarly, the rejection of H3 indicates that farm price
decreases are not fully transmitted to the retail level.
Note that the alternative hypotheses to H2 and H3 can be
either positive or negative.
3.4.  Testing for Asymmetric Farm Price Transmission
The purpose of this test is to formally assess the
competitive conduct of middlemen regarding price
transmission. Tests discussed in section 2.2. are
necessary but not sufficient to identify asymmetry in
farm price transmission. To address the issue of
asymmetric price transmission, the parameters
associated with an increase in farm price must be
compared to those associated with a decrease in farm
price. Hence, this category of test verifies whether the
marketing margin reacts differently to an increase or a
decrease in the farm price.
As mentioned previously, the extreme case of
asymmetric price transmission is long-run asymmetry. In
order to test for that phenomenon, which reflects
permanent, above normal profits for middlemen, the
following test is performed:
                                                       
3 Note that the parameters of DECMC (a2B,i) should exhibit a
negative sign because this variable is an absolute value.
(H4) 0
0 0
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where l = max[M1;M2].
Note that if the number of lags is different between the
rising phase and the falling phases in farm price (i.e. M1
„ M2), then the last Mt-Mv (where Mt>Mv) parameters
of the variable having the shorter lag length are simply
assumed to be zero with no variance.
To assess short-run asymmetry in price
transmission, at least one of the following equalities in
H5 must be rejected:
(H5)      0
0 0






i i a a
where j = 0,1,..., max[M1;M2]-1.
Note that it is possible to have short-run asymmetry and
no long-run asymmetry in price transmission, and vice
versa. If none of the equalities in H4 and H5 are
rejected, one should still test for price leveling. Price
leveling is not only characterized by symmetry in price
transmission, but also by the fact that all individual
parameters associated with increases in farm prices are
equal to those associated with decreases in farm prices,
for a specific period. Consequently, price leveling
implies an identical lag length for farm price increases
and farm price decreases. The appropriate test for price
leveling is provided by expression H6.
(H6)     ‰a4,i‰ = ‰a5,i‰  " i
If none of the equalities in H1, H2, H3, H4, H5 and H6
are rejected, then a perfectly competitive conduct from




Fluid milk does not undergo major transformation
between the farm and the retail outlet. Consequently, a
close relationship between the fluid milk farm price and
the retail price is expected. The model given by
equation (8) is estimated for the Northeast U.S., UpstateAsymmetry in Farm-Retail Price Transmission Frigon, Doyon, Romain
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New York and New York City
4. By examining these
three specific regions, it was possible to test the
middlemen’s behavior with respect to price transmission
and asymmetry in price transmission in a region with a
low retail market concentration (NYC) and in another
with a relatively high retail market concentration
(Upstate New York)
5. Furthermore, the particular
features of the New York City market (low degree of
concentration, high population density, multiple
activities) might create an important information
problem among consumers, which would favor
asymmetric price transmission as mentioned previously
(Stiglitz, 1989).
4.2.  Data Description
The models are estimated using monthly data for the
1980-1997 period, and all economic variables are
expressed in real terms using the consumer price index
for the Northeast U.S. as deflator (1982-84=100). This
imposes homogeneity of degree zero on the economic
relationships. A brief description of the variables is
presented below.
M : Marketing margin, i.e. the difference between the
retail price and the farm price of fluid milk.
Farm prices for Upstate New York and NYC are
simply the Class I price of the New York-New
Jersey Federal Milk Marketing Order (FMMO)
based on one half gallon of milk with 3.5% butterfat
(source : New York State Departement of Agriculture
and Markets [NYSDAM]). Farm prices for
Northeast U.S. is the Class I price average (weighted
by quantity) of the four FMMO’s that regulate this
area, i.e. New York-New Jersey, New England,
Middle Atlantic and Eastern Ohio-Western
Pennsylvania FMMO’s  (source : NYSDAM).
Retail prices in Upstate New York and NYC are
prices of one half-gallon of whole milk (source:
NYSDAM). For Northeast U.S., prices are from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
TREND: Trend variable ; this variable takes the value
1,2,3,…,215 (215 monthly observations).
                                                       
4  The "New York City" term designates the 11 counties of the
New York City metropolitan region. Upstate New York
includes the rest of  the counties in the State. According to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics definition, the Northeastern region
includes the following States: Maine, New Hampshire,
Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New
York, New Jersey  and Pennsylvania.
5  See Franklin and Cotterill (1993).
Q:  Quantity of milk used by processors for the fluid
market. For Upstate New York and NYC, this
variable reflects Class I milk in the New York-New
Jersey FMMO. For Northeast U.S., this variable is
total quantity of milk used in Class I in the 4
FMMOs mentioned previously (source:
NYSDAM). The L1 suffix indicates that the
variable has been lagged by one month.
MC : A marketing cost index; its construction is
based on the estimated share of total marketing
costs of the main intermediaries in the industry, i.e.
processors, retailers, and haulers. Labor, energy and
packaging are the marketing costs that were taking
into account (source : BLS). The INC and DEC
prefixes reflect the fact that this variable has been
split in rising and falling marketing cost phases,
following Houck’s methodology (1977).
INCFP : Cumulative farm price increase as defined
previously ($/cwt). The Li suffix indicates that this
variable has been lagged by i months.
DECFP : Cumulative farm price decrease as defined
previously ($/cwt). The Li suffix indicates that this
variable has been lagged by i months. Similarly, the
suffixes 1991 added at the end of the variable
denote a slope shifter to evaluate if the marginal
effect of that variable has changed since the
imposition of the price gouging law in NYC (1991).
D1…D11: Monthly binary variables. Di takes the value
1 in month i, and 0 otherwise.
DD: Binary variable to reflect the deregulation of the
NYC milk market as of February 1987.
5. Empirical Results
5.1.  Lag Length
Based on previous literature, the maximum lag
length was first fit to five months for both farm price
increases (INCFP) and farm price decreases (DECFP).
Then, if the last lagged variable was not statistically
significant at the 10% level, it was excluded from the
regression. This iterative procedure stopped when the
last lag was found to be statistically different from zero.
In order to avoid multicolinearity, one could plea for an
Almon polynomial lag scheme. However, any
imposition of parameter weights would have been
purely arbitrary because no lag structure was deemed, a
priori, to be obvious.Asymmetry in Farm-Retail Price Transmission Frigon, Doyon, Romain
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For the Northeast U.S. and Upstate New York, the
iterative estimation results suggest that farm price
increases should be lagged by one month while for
NYC, no lags are significant. However, when the three
regions conflicted in terms of lag lengths, the maximum
lag length was kept in all equations. This procedure
allows homogenizing result analysis among the regions.
Therefore a one-month lag length was specified for farm
price increases (INCFP) in all three equations. For farm
price decreases, iterations for Northeast U.S. and for
NYC suggested a 4-month lag. Even though a one-
month lag would have been sufficient for Upstate New
York, all three equations were estimated with a four-
month lag.
The lag lengths are different than those found in
previous studies. Kinnucan and Forker (1987) found that
a 3 month lag was necessary for both farm price
increases and decreases to adequately model the fluid
milk market. Kinnucan and Forker reached this result by
adding an additional lag until a non-significant
parameter was found. Thus, the discrepancy can first be
explained by the different methodology used by
Kinnucan and Forker to determine the lag length. Also,
their use of national data as compared to regional data in
this study may have caused this dissimilarity. Emerick
(1994) specified a 2-month lag for both farm price
increases and decreases. Her decision was, however,
subjective and based on her a priori knowledge of the
U.S. fluid milk market.
With respect to the marketing cost variables
(INCMC and DECMC), no lagged variables were found
statistically significant. Note that these lagged variables
were included into the regressions only when the number
of lags for the farm price variables was identified. The
final estimated equation, therefore, includes only the
current values of INCMC and DECMC.
5.2.  Regression results
Table 1 presents the econometric results for the three
geographical areas. Autocorrelation was endemic in each
of the three areas. Therefore, the equations were
estimated by the maximum likelihood method with a
first order correction for autocorrelation. Because of the
controversy surrounding the use of the R
2 when OLS is
not used, correlation coefficients (CC) between the
dependent variable and the estimated values of the
regressions are reported 
6. The CC range from 0.973 to
0.987, depending upon the region. This suggests that the
models have good explanatory power.
The results presented in Table 1 conformed to
expectations. The trend variable is negative in all three
                                                       
6 See Judge et al. (1980), p.255.
equations but is not statistically different from zero at
the 5% level. This suggests that technological change
and productivity gains have not significantly reduced
the farm-retail price spread during the period. No
significant seasonal variations in the marketing margin
were apparent since a test to verify if the monthly
binary variables were jointly equal to zero could not be
rejected at the 5% level in either of the regions.
Two major regulatory changes have affected the
New York City (NYC) fluid milk market and they are
taken into account in the analysis. First, the
deregulation of the distribution of milk in NYC
permitted Farmland Dairies (a major New Jersey milk
dealer) to penetrate this market in January 1987. Before
1987, the NYC milk market was protected from outside
competition by a system of licenses that granted the
right to distribute milk to a limited number of milk
dealers. To account for this regulatory change, a
dummy variable is included in the regression as of
February 1987 (DD1987).
Results indicate that Farmland Dairies’ entry into
the market has significantly reduced marketing margins
as shown by the highly significant dummy variable
(DD1987). This suggests that the New York City milk
market deregulation has led to a lower farm-retail price
spread. This result is not surprising since the larger
New York City milk dealers were convicted of price
fixing after an investigation in the early eighties.
The second major change to New York State dairy
policy is the introduction in June 1991 of the "200%
law". The price gouging law, as it was referred to,
imposed a maximum marketing margin of 200% of the
farm price to all intermediaries in the fluid milk market.
This law was enacted by the New York State legislature
following the perceived lack of response in retail prices
of milk to decreases in farm prices. On the other hand,
farm price increases were perceived to be efficiently
transmitted to retail prices. Note that retailers in NYC
were the main targets of this law. Thus, slope shifters
(DECFPLi1991) were included in the NYC equation to
test if the price gouging law changed the behavior of
middlemen regarding transmission of farm price
decreases.
Results indicate that the price gouging law has
changed the way that New York City’s middlemen
transmit farm price decreases since most parameters of
the variable DECFP1991 and its lags are statistically
significant. This result has implications on farm price
transmission asymmetry before and after 1991, as will
be discussed below.
A similar methodology was used in the Northeast
U.S. equation to assess the impact of the reduced role of
the price support program in setting farm prices sinceAsymmetry in Farm-Retail Price Transmission Frigon, Doyon, Romain
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1989. However, the inclusion of slope shifters for the
variables INCFP and DECFP and their lags as of 1989
in the Northeast U.S. equation has not produced any
significant results. Moreover, a statistical test aimed at
verifying if these slope shifters were simultaneously
equal to zero could not be rejected. According to this
result, it seems that the forsaking of the price support
policy since 1989 in the U.S. dairy industry has not
changed middlemen behavior regarding price
transmission. Consequently, governmental intervention
as a cause of asymmetry, as formulated by Kinnucan and
Forker (1987), could not be confirmed by our results.
Therefore, slope shifters for 1989 are omitted from the
presentation.
Assuming that processors may not be able to
transmit instantaneously to their selling prices the
economies of scale that may result from a greater
quantity of milk used in Class I, the quantity variable
was lagged by one month (QL1). This variable is
statistically significant only in NYC. The rationale
behind the negative sign for this variable is that fluid
milk processors ruled by a Federal or State Milk
Marketing Order can order as much milk as they wish.
However, only milk that is finally directed to the fluid
milk consumption market is calculated as being part of
Class I. The remaining milk is calculated (even though
processed by fluid milk plants) as being part of either
Class II or Class III and receives a lower price. Thus, the
larger the quantity used in Class I, the more profitable it
is for fluid milk processors. The non-significant result
for the Northeast U.S. and Upstate New York may
reflect that this variable is a poor proxy for the actual
milk consumption in these regions.
5.3.  Marketing Cost Transmission
Results on marketing cost increases and decreases
(INCMC and DECMC) are similar across the three
regions. As mentioned previously, no lagged variables
were kept on the final estimated equations since they
were not statistically significant. This result suggests that
variations in marketing costs are transmitted to the farm-
retail price spread within a month. It should, however, be
noted that in all regions, marketing cost increases are
significant while marketing cost decreases are not. This
tends to suggest asymmetric marketing cost transmission
but the formal test of this hypothesis was not accepted
(Table 2). Consequently, no statistical evidence of non-
competitive conduct by middlemen with respect to this
cost variable can be established.
5.4.  Farm Price Transmission
Results on farm price transmission are presented in
Table 3. In all regions, there is no statistical evidence
supporting the hypothesis that farm price increases are
not fully transmitted to retail price since the hypothesis
of full price transmission is not rejected (H2). With
respect to the transmission of farm price decreases,
statistical evidence that they are not fully transmitted to
retail price is only found in NYC (H3), and only before
the price gouging law was enacted. Similarly, results
indicate that long-run asymmetry in price transmission
did occur only in NYC before the price gouging law
(H4). The long-run asymmetry in the price adjustment
process in NYC before 1991 suggests that an under-
allocation of milk in Class I occurred because of the
permanent above-competitive-level selling-price of
milk. Moreover, under-allocation of milk in Class I
could have resulted in sustainable lost of income for
farmers because of the higher price for this category.
Consumers may also have suffered from the non-
competitive conduct of middlemen through higher
prices, and consequently, under-consumption of milk.
Therefore, assuming low cost to the government, these
results suggest that the price gouging law has increased
the society’s welfare by pushing the production and
consumption of fluid milk toward the competitive level.
Table 3 also reports the test results on short-run
asymmetry (H5) in the farm-retail price transmission.
After 3 months, short-run asymmetry exists in NYC
and in the Northeast U.S. Asymmetric price response
seems to be milder in Upstate New York, since it lasts
only for 2 months.
Results for Upstate New York contrast
fundamentally with those of NYC before the imposition
of the price gouging law. In fact, middlemen in Upstate
New York seem to act quite competitively regarding
price transmission without being forced to do so by any
binding law and even though they are much more
concentrated than their counterparts in NYC. This tends
to support the hypothesis that the problem of consumer
information is the predominant cause of asymmetric
price transmission, rather than a high degree of
concentration in the industry above the farm gate. This
result is further strengthened by the fact that, in line
with the SCP model, the retailer’s four firm
concentration ratio was included as an exogenous
variable to the Upstate New York and NYC equations.
This variable did not, however, generate any significant
results. This result is similar to that of Binkley &
Connor (1996) for dairy products. Moreover, the
parameters of the CR-4 variable had a negative sign and
its inclusion in the equations altered the significance
level of the trend term. Thus, it seems that the impact of
the CR-4 concentration ratio, which has not decreased
since 1980 in the two geographical areas, is captured by
the trend variable (gain in productivity, technologicalAsymmetry in Farm-Retail Price Transmission Frigon, Doyon, Romain
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progress). This hypothesis is strengthened by the high
correlation between the two variables. Consequently we
decided not to include the CR-4 variable in the estimated
equation.
Note that there is no evidence of short-run
asymmetry (within 1 month) in the Northeast U.S. and in
Upstate New York. This indicates that the marketing
margin expands in the same proportion after a farm price
increase or decrease. However, in NYC, price
transmission asymmetry begins instantaneously.
Our general results regarding price transmission
asymmetry are different than those of Kinnucan and
Forker (1987) and of Emerick (1994). While the present
study finds evidence of short-run asymmetry in the fluid
milk market, these studies found evidence of long-run
asymmetry. The difference could be attributed, partly, to
methodological differences in the modeling approaches,
the data used, and the period covered by the analysis.
Unlike Kinnucan and Forker and Emerick, who assumed
a competitive environment, the methodology proposed
in this study formally defines long-run asymmetry as
being a permanent deviation from a competitive market
situation. Also, the use of spatially disaggregated data
that reflects different regional market structures as well
as the time period under study may have contributed to
the different results.
6. Conclusion
This paper proposes a model that is a hybrid of those
usually used in the literature on asymmetric price
transmission. The model was estimated for three regions:
the Northeast U.S., Upstate New York and New York
City. Results indicate that long-run asymmetry was
present in the NYC market before the application of the
price gouging law in June 1991 but disappeared
thereafter. This last element, combined with the fact that
only a short-run asymmetry seems to have remained
since 1991, suggest that the New York State legislature
has successfully inhibited permanent above-normal
profit earned by middlemen. Results for the Northeast
U.S. and Upstate New York show that middlemen have
transmitted the farm price fluctuations in an asymmetric
way in the short-run. These observations provide support
for the modern market theorist’s view on the role of
market concentration.
It is important to note that the use of the Class I
price as the farm price for fluid milk does not take into
account over-order payment, which may be the source of
the short-run asymmetry observed in the three
geographical areas. In fact, if one observes that the over-
order payment increases when the farm price of milk
goes down and that it remains constant when the farm
price goes up, then the over-order payment granted by
processors might be the source of short-run asymmetry.
Because of this possibility, it cannot be rigorously
concluded that the short run asymmetry phenomenon is
necessarily the result of non-competitive conduct from
middlemen.
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Table 1 : Estimated parameter values of the fluid milk margin equations in New York City, Upstate New York and Northeast
U.S.



























































































CC 0.98672 0.97298 0.97309
The values in parentheses are the standard error of the coefficients. The estimated coefficients of the monthly dummy variables are not
reported in order to make the presentation easier.
*   Significant at the 5% level ; ** Significant at the 1% level.Asymmetry in Farm-Retail Price Transmission Frigon, Doyon, Romain
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Table 2 : Marketing cost transmission test results (F-test)
























(H2) Farm price increase
fully transmitted
0.6666 0.6666 0.1167 0.1705
(H3) Farm price decrease
fully transmitted
5.0317* 1.4091 0.1456 3.0928
(H4) No asymmetry after
month 4
4.8876* 2.1933 1.4135 1.0486
(H5) No asymmetry after
month 3
7.6576** 4.9174* 2.4714 6.5617*
(H5) No asymmetry after
month 2
8.1896** 6.3919* 4.5097* 3.2460
(H5) No asymmetry after
month 1
11.4629** 10.1217** 4.6692* 6.1604*
(H5) No asymmetry after
month 0
11.1584** 11.0009** 1.0521 0.1233
* Null hypothesis rejected at the 5% level
** Null hypothesis rejected at the 1% level.FOOD MARKETING POLICY CENTER
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